Abstract. We study an incomplete information game in which players can coordinate their actions by contracting among themselves. We model this relationship as a reciprocal contracting procedure where each player has the ability to make commitments contingent on the other players'commitments. We characterize the outcomes that can be supported as perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcomes in this reciprocal contracting game. We use our characterization to show that the set of supportable outcomes with reciprocal contracting is larger than the set of outcomes available in a centralized design problem where a mechanism designer can o¤er contracts in which all players would voluntarily participate: Unlike this centralized design procedure, the reciprocal contracting game makes it possible for players to convey partial information about their types at the time they o¤er contracts. We discuss the implications of our analysis for modeling collusion between multiple agents interacting with the same principal.
Introduction
Consider a couple contemplating marriage. This couple regards marriage as a mutual commitment which would constrain the choices each of them can make about his/her own life. Before …nalizing their decision to get married, they have to discuss many parameters of their new life together including where they will get married, where they will live, how they will …nance their future, if they will have children, etc. There is a possibility that they cannot agree on some of these issues and therefore they do not get married, at least for the time being. In this case, there is no commitment made and the potential spouses have access to the same set of choices as they had before they had started talking about marriage. However, once the question of marriage arises, it would be naïve to imagine that its alternative is the continuation of the status quo for this couple. For instance, if one party held a less conciliatory position during the failed marriage deliberations, the other one may start questioning the reliability of his/her partner. The statements made by these two people are not only the potential building blocks of a marriage agreement between them but also a means of signaling who they are to their partner. The information revealed by these signals is relevant in shaping the outside option for the marriage as it is relevant in devising the marriage.
In the language of this paper, the two partners above are the players of an incomplete information default game, and marriage is a contract that they can sign with the purpose of constraining / coordinating their actions in this game. Other examples captured by this setting include competing …rms deliberating a cartel agreement, bidders discussing the formation of an auction bidding ring, and disputing governments negotiating a peace settlement. Our objective is to …nd out what outcomes the players can achieve in the default game with the help of contracts.
In what follows, we endow each player with the ability to communicate with other players and to make commitments based on these communications. In particular, we let each player write a reciprocal contract which conditions his default game actions directly on the contracts of the other players. The exact nature of how this conditioning works is explained in detail below (Section 4). In a nutshell, if all the reciprocal contracts agree with one another, then they implement some kind of a cooperative action. If they do not agree, then the contracts are void and each player is free to choose any action he wants in the default game.
Reciprocal contracts are a convenient way to model the kind of contracting situations we have in mind because, as shown by Peters (2012) , their equilibrium outcomes can mimic the equilibrium outcomes of a broad variety of di¤erent contracting games. This is important for problems like marriage, cartel formation, or collusion where it is di¢ cult to know exactly how contracts are being negotiated. Reciprocal contracting provides a way to understand the entire spectrum of behavior that is supportable with contracts.
Our analysis di¤ers from Peters (2012) in that players in our reciprocal contracting game do not have enough commitment power to enforce punishments. Essentially players can bind their actions when all players unanimously agree to some course of action. Otherwise, any kind of disagreement leads to a complete breakdown with every player choosing his action in a sequentially rational way during the default game. For instance, if a …rm does not want to participate in a cartel agreement, we do not allow some other …rm to cut its price to zero just as a punishment for the non-participating …rm. Instead, we require that each …rm chooses the default game action that maximizes its expected payo¤ in case of a disagreement. 1 Our main result is the characterization of all the outcome functions that can be supported as equilibrium outcomes in our constrained reciprocal contracting game (Section 5). An important subset of these outcomes is supported by equilibria which do not involve any information revelation by the players during the negotiation of the contract. We argue that these pooling equilibrium outcomes coincide with the outcomes that can be sustained by a mechanism designer, who is constrained to o¤er a contract that is acceptable to all players regardless of their private information and who cannot in ‡uence the play in the default game when a player unexpectedly rejects the contract.
However we also show that the reciprocal contracting game has separating (or partially separating) equilibria that support outcomes that this constrained mechanism designer cannot. The ability to reveal partial information during the contracting process changes the outside option of players in the default game, should they decide not to cooperate. In a separating equilibrium, a player could still trigger the noncooperative play of the default game by not reciprocating with the other players. In this case, the default game would be played under the updated beliefs on the types of the non-deviating players because of the signaling that occurs through the contract o¤ers that these players make. As a consequence, the payo¤ that the deviating player receives is the expectation of his non-cooperative payo¤ against the various posterior beliefs he might face. This expectation could well be lower than what this player would have received in the default game played under the prior beliefs.
A separating equilibrium outcome should give each player a payo¤ at least as large as his expected non-cooperative payo¤ under the updated posterior beliefs. This consideration is the source of the individual rationality constraint. A separating equilibrium outcome should also be incentive compatible. In particular, we need this outcome to be incentive compatible not only under the prior beliefs but also under the posterior beliefs which are updated according to the o¤ered contracts. This is the reason why the incentive compatibility requirement for a separating equilibrium outcome is generally stronger than interim incentive compatibility.
The analysis of the reciprocal contracting game has important implications on identifying the collusion potential between multiple agents responding to a grand contract designed by a principal (Section 6). The standard approach in the collusion literature is to assume that collusion is mediated by a third party, such as the above mentioned constrained mechanism designer. 2 This third party aims to maximize the sum of the (ex-ante) payo¤s of the colluding agents. 3 When this mediator is constrained to choose among "continuation equilibria" in which the agents have passive beliefs o¤ the equilibrium path, 4 La¤ont and Martimort (1997) observe that the mediator's proposal will only be unanimously accepted by the agents if it is interim incentive compatible and it Pareto dominates the noncooperative play of the default game induced by the principal's grand contract. It follows immediately that a su¢ cient condition for collusion proofness of an outcome is interim incentive e¢ ciency. 5 The argument also works the other way around. If the principal o¤ers an indirect grand contract that induces the mediator to manipulate the scheme, then the principal could replace this grand contract and the mediator's manipulation with the corresponding direct grand contract. La¤ont and Martimort show that the mediator would have no incentive to manipulate the truthful reporting equilibrium of such a direct grand contract. In this sense, interim incentive e¢ ciency of an outcome is both necessary and su¢ cient for collusion proofness. This is the basis for the well known collusion proofness principle.
2 A recent exception is the work by Zheng (2011) , who refers to our reciprocal contracting approach in order to investigate collusion (formation of fund-pooling consortiums) between liquidity constrained bidders. 3 Che and Kim (2006) consider extensions of this problem where the objective function is a weighted sum of the colluding agents'utilities with potentially di¤erent weights for di¤erent agents or for di¤erent types. They also account for the possibility that not all of the agents collude. Our discussion would apply to this general case as well. 4 Players have passive beliefs if, when one player unexpectedly rejects the mediator's contract, the others play the default game with beliefs about the deviator that coincide with their prior beliefs. More generally, the mediator could select outcomes where non-deviators changed their beliefs about the deviating player as part of a punishment as in Caillaud and Jehiel (1998) . 5 An outcome is interim incentive e¢ cient if it is Pareto undominated within the class of interim incentive compatible outcomes which are feasible in the corresponding default game.
By contrast, reciprocal contracting approach allows the agents to negotiate a collusive agreement among themselves by playing some extensive form bargaining game without relying on the help of an outside mediator. Thanks to the separating equilibria of the reciprocal contracting game, the colluding agents can generally achieve better outcomes yielding a higher sum of ex-ante payo¤s than what can be sustained with the help of the La¤ont -Martimort mediator.
A surprising aspect of reciprocal contracting is that it gives the principal the opportunity to implement outcomes which are not collusion proof. To see why, imagine that the principal o¤ers an indirect grand contract and the agents collude by coordinating on the "best" reciprocal contracting equilibrium which maximizes their ex-ante total payo¤ (within the class of all reciprocal contracting equilibria corresponding to the default game induced by the indirect grand contract). Suppose further that this equilibrium is a separating equilibrium where some agents reveal partial information about their types with their contract o¤ers. Accordingly the resulting equilibrium outcome is individually rational and incentive compatible under the corresponding equilibrium posterior beliefs.
One might argue that the principal could then use the revelation principle to replace this best reciprocal contracting equilibrium outcome with a direct grand contract that implements the same outcome. This works …ne if the outcome supported by the reciprocal contracting game is interim incentive e¢ cient. However, it may be that the outcome of the best reciprocal contracting equilibrium is Pareto dominated by an alternative interim incentive compatible outcome. This alternative outcome is incentive compatible under the interim beliefs but not under the posterior beliefs updated on the equilibrium path (therefore the alternative outcome is not a separating equilibrium outcome of the original indirect grand contract). In case that the principal tries to implement the reciprocal contracting outcome with a direct grand contract, the agents would be able to coordinate on such an alternative outcome, suggesting that the equilibrium outcome is not collusion proof. On the other hand, this outcome is still implementable for the principal, since there exists an indirect grand contract and a collusive continuation play by the agents inducing the desired outcome.
To reconcile the La¤ont -Martimort and reciprocal contracting approaches to collusion, we consider a setting which is commonly studied by the earlier literature on collusion (Section 7). We show that in a private values environment which satis…es a single crossing condition and in which the payo¤s are transferrable among the colluding agents, the best reciprocal contracting equilibrium supports an outcome function that is interim incentive e¢ cient. In this setting, the principal can still …nd his optimal outcome by restricting attention to interim incentive e¢ cient outcomes and implement this outcome with a direct grand contract.
Literature
Our paper exploits an old idea from the industrial organization literature that contracts can condition on one another (Salop, 1986 ). This idea is given precise content by Tennenholtz (2004) who formalizes a game played by computer programs, each of which conditions its action on the program of the other player. Tennenholtz shows that every pro…le of actions for which each player receives at least his minmax payo¤ can be supported as a Nash equilibrium in programs. Kalai et al. (2010) uses the same idea to describe a two player contracting game of complete information where the Nash equilibrium set coincides with the set of joint mixtures over actions for which each player receives at least his minmax payo¤.
When information is incomplete, it is not obvious how to describe the set of outcomes achievable with contracts. One way to proceed is assuming the existence of a mechanism designer who receives type reports from players and then tells each player what action to take. Players who agree to participate in the mechanism are bound to take the action suggested by the designer. However, they may refuse to participate. In that case, the mechanism designer can enforce an arbitrary punishment by forcing the participating players to take actions they may not necessarily like once they know some player is not participating. Moreover, the designer can use the private information of the participating players to increase the impact of this punishment. For instance, suppose the aim is punishing a potential customer for a nuclear missile after its decision not to participate in the mechanism to allocate this weapon Stacchetti, 1996 and 1999) . In order to punish this act of non-participation, the mechanism designer can aggregate the private information of all the participating customers, determine the identity of the one who could potentially in ‡ict the highest negative externality on the non-participating customer, and then assign the weapon to this highest externality customer for free. An outcome is implementable by this unconstrained designer if players unanimously want to participate in the mechanism and report their types truthfully. Accordingly, these unconstrained designer-implementable outcomes are characterized with the appropriate individual rationality and incentive compatibility conditions (see for instance Myerson, 1991, Chapter 6) .
Peters and Szentes (2012) consider n-player incomplete information games and introduce two restrictions on the contracting game which make it possible to provide a complete characterization of equilibrium outcomes. The …rst of these conditions is called cross-referentiality -essentially the property provided by computer programs as identi…ed by Tennenholtz. The second condition is referred to by Peters (2012) as regularity. Regularity prevents punishments that condition on the action chosen by a deviator. 6 Peters and Szentes show that a game in which players'contracts are required to be de…nable functions of the (Godel coding of the) other players' contracts is a regular contracting game satisfying the cross-referentiality property. They provide a characterization of equilibrium outcomes which shows that, with private values, the set of outcome functions supported by the pure strategy Bayesian equilibria coincides with the set of deterministic outcome functions that are implementable by an unconstrained mechanism designer. Peters and Szentes also show that, outside the private values environment, the set of outcome functions supportable as equilibrium outcomes in their game is strictly smaller than the set of implementable outcomes by an unconstrained mechanism designer. The reason for this is that the only way that type information is conveyed to other players in their game is through the contract o¤ers the players make. This means that a player who decides to deviate from an equilibrium knows that he will learn this information before he is forced to choose his own action. This additional information will let the deviator respond better to the punishment imposed by the non-deviators. By contrast, an unconstrained mechanism designer would hide this information from the deviator, e¤ectively reducing the payo¤ of a player who refuses to cooperate. 6 In general, games among programs are not regular. For example if each player's program is a Turing machine, the game will not be regular. In that case, all that can be said is that the set of outcome functions that are supportable as Bayesian equilibrium outcomes in the game among the programs is at least as large as the set of outcome functions supportable by a central planner. Another contracting game that is not regular is the one described by Yamashita (2011) -see Peters and Troncoso-Valverde (2011). The problem that arises with irregular games is that the contracts may be able to implement punishments that depend on what a defecting player decides to do. Peters (2012) provides a game he refers to as the reciprocal contracting game, whose perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcomes coincide with the implementable outcomes by an unconstrained mechanism designer in any environment. He accomplishes this by allowing players to delay the revelation of their type information until after contracts have been o¤ered. Independently, Forges (2011) generalizes the game in Kalai et al. to show that the set of Bayesian Nash equilibrium outcomes in her game coincides with the set of implementable outcome functions.
These earlier characterization results on conditional contracts do not have much relevance when the aim is studying contracts which cannot include separate "punishment clauses" for non-participants. The good news is that Peters (2012) also proves a theorem which ensures that an outcome function that is supportable as an equilibrium in some regular contracting game, whether that game satis…es the cross-referentiality property or not, must also be supportable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in the reciprocal contracting game. This suggests that the equilibrium sets associated with more realistic games in which players'contracting ability is restricted can be understood by imposing relatively straightforward restrictions on the reciprocal contracting game and then looking at the additional constraints that these restrictions impose on the set of outcomes.
This is the approach we adopt here. The constraint we impose is simply to con…ne the set of reciprocal contracts available to the players to those that allow players to choose their actions in the default game freely, in the event that the contract proposals are not consistent with each other. Unlike the game studied by Peterswhere players can commit to punishments o¤ the equilibrium path, the actions of all players must be sequentially rational during the "punishment phase" of our game. Our goal is to characterize the supportable outcomes in this case.
The sequential rationality assumption leads to a subtle change in the contracting game. Once the negotiation of the contract is completed -either successfully or unsuccessfully -the players'beliefs about the other players'types typically will not be the same as their prior beliefs. This is thanks to the signaling opportunities provided within the reciprocal contracting procedure. In particular, if a player deviates from his equilibrium behavior by "not reciprocating" with the others, the non-deviating players understand that the deviating player has learned something about their types during the failed negotiations. As we will see below, this can modify their sequentially rational continuation behavior in a way that reduces the default game payo¤ of the deviating player (relative to what he would have expected if the default game was played under the prior beliefs).
The set of implementable outcomes as described by Peters or Forges is much larger than the set of outcomes that we can support with our constrained reciprocal contracts: Restricting the ability on committing to punishments tightens both the individual rationality and the incentive compatibility requirements on the outcome functions. These stronger constraints can be thought as the cost of depriving the players of the ability to commit to non-credible punishments or alternatively as the cost of not having access to an unconstrained mechanism designer who can pursue these punishments on the players'behalf.
A more intriguing result follows from the comparison of our reciprocal contracting game with the constrained centralized design approach that is used in the literature on cartel formation and collusion. As we mentioned in the Introduction, the constrained mechanism designer may o¤er contracts that would be acceptable to the players but cannot impose punishments or a¤ect the play of the default game in any other way if some player refuses to participate in the contract. We will see that the signaling aspect of reciprocal contracts cannot be replicated with this constrained centralization scheme. This is the reason why the set of outcomes supportable with reciprocal contracts is strictly larger than the set of outcomes implementable by the constrained designer.
Due to our reliance on signaling, our paper also relates to mechanism design papers by Cramton and Palfrey (1995) , Caillaud and Jehiel (1998) , Tan and Yilankaya (2007) , Jullien, Pouyet, and Sand-Zantman (2011). In these papers, the design problem is a centralized one where an uninformed constrained designer o¤ers a contract to the players. As in our paper, a player can trigger the non-cooperative play of the default game by refusing this contract. A player's acceptance decision is the only means of signaling his type to the others before the contract takes into e¤ect. This strand of the literature studies equilibria where all types of all players accept the designer's o¤er. Therefore belief updates are possible only o¤ the equilibrium path, when a player refuses the designer's contract unexpectedly. By contrast, in our decentralized design setting, we need to account for on the equilibrium path belief updates which are supported by the type dependence of the players'contracts. The information revealed at the contracting stage a¤ects players'incentives on the equilibrium path as well as o¤ of it. For this reason, our characterization result will refer to incentive compatibility constraints which are di¤erent than the standard interim constraints.
In earlier work (Celik and Peters, 2011), we show that equilibrium path signaling can be sustained even in a constrained centralized design setting. This is possible if players' acceptance decisions of the designer's contract depend on their types. 7 In this earlier work, we demonstrate that the equilibrium path belief update opportunities enlarge the set of available outcomes. However, the additional outcomes achieved through signaling require the contract to be rejected with a strictly positive probability. Thus, a familiar individual rationality requirement was not helpful in the characterization of the available outcomes in this centralized design setting. In the current paper, we extend the signaling opportunities for the players by adopting a decentralized design perspective. This leads to a characterization result which has been evasive in the centralized design setting.
The Default Game
In an environment with incomplete information, I is the set of players. We refer to the private information of a player as his type. Each player i 2 I has a …nite type set T i . The actions available to player i in this game are elements of set A i , which is a closed subset of an Euclidean space with …nite dimension. In standard notation A and T are cross product spaces representing all players'actions and types respectively. Notice that, by this construction, A is a subset of an Euclidean space R K . 8 In order to retain the idea that sensible o¤ the equilibrium path beliefs about a player can only change after that player himself has deviated, we assume from the outset that types are independently distributed. Player i's type is distributed with respect to the prior distribution
as the collection of these priors. 0 i (t i ) is the probability that player i has type t i 2 T i under the prior distribution. Similarly,
denotes the probability that the realization of the type pro…le is t = ft i g i2I 2 T . 7 In a similar vein, Philippon and Skreta (2012) and Tirole (2012) argue that a failing …rm's refusal to participate in a government sponsored bailout plan may signal its con…dence in the performance of its assets. 8 If k i is the dimension of action set A i for each player i, then K is smaller than or equal to P i2I k i . Our construction allows for the possibility that A i is …nite for each i. In this case, A can be considered as a …nite subset of real line R.
Preferences of player i are given by the payo¤ function u i : A T ! R. Players have expected utility preferences over lotteries. If q 2 A is a randomization over action pro…les and t 2 T is a type pro…le, then u i (q; t) refers to the associated expected utility with a slight abuse of notation. An outcome function is a mapping from type pro…les into randomizations over action pro…les ! : T ! A.
In the absence of a technology to write down and commit to mechanisms, the set of players, the action sets, the type sets, and the payo¤ functions de…ne a Bayesian game together with the prior distribution 0 = 0 i i2I
. However, the fact that players may choose di¤erent actions under di¤erent beliefs is central to our analysis. Therefore we study this game under an arbitrary distribution = f i g i2I , rather than the prior distribution. As in the de…nition of the prior distribution, i is an element of T i and i (t i ) is the probability that player i has type t i under this distribution.
We refer to the collection I; fT i g i2I ; fA i g i2I ; fu i g i2I , and as the default game under belief . When playing this game, each type of each player chooses his action to maximize his expected payo¤. Accordingly, collection of functions fq i ( j )g i2I constitutes a Bayesian equilibrium of the default game under belief if each action in the support of randomization q i (t i j ) is a solution to
for each type t i 2 T i of each player i 2 I. The operator E t i j i stands for the expectation over the values of t i given belief i . 9 We restrict attention to default games for which a Bayesian equilibrium exists. Existence of equilibrium is immediate for games with …nite action sets. For simplicity of exposition, we assume further that there is a unique Bayesian equilibrium of the default game. We can extend the analysis to games with multiple equilibria with a slightly more complicated statement of the incentive constraints below. Alternatively, the unique equilibrium, to which we refer, can be thought as the equilibrium chosen (among possibly multiple equilibria) by some selection criteria. 10 Suppose that fq i ( j )g i2I is the Bayesian equilibrium of the default game under belief . We de…ne the non-cooperative payo¤ V i as the function that maps the 9 In standard notation, subscript i refers to the collection of one variable for each player other than player i. For instance, t i = ft j g j2I fig . 10 A similar uniqueness assumption appears in the recent work of Hagenbach, Koessler, and Perez-Richet (2012) with the same justi…cation.
types of player i and the beliefs into expected equilibrium payo¤s:
3.1. Example: The Cournot Default Game. Consider a game played by two quantity setting …rms (players) who have the technology to produce the same homogenous good. Each player has a constant unit production cost which is his private information. Unit cost (type) of player 1 is either 48 or 56. Unit cost of player 2 is either 52 or 80. These types are independently distributed for the players. The inverse demand function for the good they produce is given as P = 80 (y 1 + y 2 ), where P is the price and y 1 , y 2 are the production levels of players 1 and 2. Assuming that each player is an expected pro…t maximizer, we can write player i's utility function as
Since each player has a binary type set, we can represent a probability distribution over the types of a player with a single probability. Let i denote the probability that player i has a lower cost type. That is, 1 is the probability that player 1 has type (48) and 2 is the probabilities that player 2 has type (52). Under any pair of beliefs ( 1 ; 2 ), this game has a unique Bayesian equilibrium. The resulting equilibrium production and expected payo¤ levels are as in the 
Regardless of the beliefs, the high cost type of player 2 produces zero output, since his production cost is higher than the price. For the other three types (types (48) and (56) of player 1 and type (52) of player 2), the equilibrium behavior and the expected payo¤ depend on the beliefs under which the game is played. Notice that player i's Bayesian equilibrium output and expected payo¤ are weakly decreasing in his belief that his rival (player j) has the lower cost ( j ), and weakly increasing in player j's belief that player i has the lower cost ( i ).
We now introduce an extension of this game by allowing monetary transfers between the players. We assume that in addition to setting his production level y i , each player can also make a non-negative transfer z i to the other player. Players maximize their utility net of the transfers. 11 These monetary transfers will be useful instruments for agreements between the players. However, in the absence of a binding mechanism, the equilibrium behavior for each player is making a zero transfer. Therefore the equilibrium payo¤ functions we gave above are the non-cooperative payo¤s for the extended game as well. This game, which we call the Cournot default game, is a modi…ed version of the example studied by Celik and Peters (2011) .
In what follows, we will refer to the Cournot default game several times in order to illustrate some key points of our analysis.
The Reciprocal Contracting Game
The contracting process takes place in two rounds. In the …rst round, players o¤er contracts. These contracts determine a mechanism for each player, which commits this player to an action contingent on messages that are sent in the second round. The key feature of this process is the dependence of a player's mechanism on the mechanisms of the other players. This conditioning can either be explicit, as in Peters and Szentes (2012), or implicit as in the contracting game we explain below.
In line with the literature, we de…ne a mechanism for a player as a mapping from the cross product of the message sets into the actions that this player can take. The contracting game relies on the class of direct mechanisms. A player's message to a direct mechanism consists of a type report t i and a correlating message n i which is a K dimensional vector whose components are real numbers on the interval [0; 1]. Recall that number K represents the dimension of the set of action pro…les A. A direct mechanism for player i transforms the type reports and the correlating messages of the jIj players into a default game action that this player will take. Let N be the set of jIj K matrices consisting of real numbers on the interval [0; 1]. Then a direct mechanism for player i is formally de…ned as:
Notice that direct mechanisms are de…ned as deterministic mechanisms, i.e., each message pro…le is mapped into a single action instead of a randomization over actions. When proving our characterization theorem, we will explain how the correlating message vectors would generate a jointly controlled lottery which supports randomizations over actions. Moreover we will show that these randomizations may be correlated across players as well. 12 M i denotes the set of all direct mechanisms for player i.
In the …rst round of the contracting game, each player o¤ers a reciprocal contract. A reciprocal contract gives a player the opportunity to make a revelation about his type and the possibility of committing to a mechanism contingent on the revelations made by the others. Recall that types of players are independently distributed. Before the …rst round of the contracting procedure, all the other players believe that prior 0 i governs the distribution of player i's type. After observing the revelation made by player i, the prior belief on this player may be updated to a posterior belief. We need the set of possible revelations by each player to be large enough to support any possible posterior distribution. For this reason, we model each player's revelation as announcing a distribution of his types. Formally, a reciprocal contract for player i consists of a revelation^ i 2 T i and a list of potential direct mechanisms which is represented by a mapping from revelations of all players into pro…les of direct mechanisms
These contracts determine the players' mechanisms as follows: If all contracts include the same list , then the mechanisms are indeed pinned down by how this function maps the submitted revelations of players into a mechanism pro…le. That is, if the players'o¤ers in the …rst round agree on function , than the direct mechanism i ^ determines the mechanism that player i will follow in the second round, where
is the pro…le of revelations made in the …rst round. However, if there is at least one player who o¤ered a contract containing a di¤erent list than did the other players, then no mechanism takes e¤ect. Instead, each player i chooses his default game action non-cooperatively. Reciprocal contracts are intended to look like mutual agreements -if all players agree, cooperation occurs. Otherwise, when a player does not reciprocate, as a "punishment" to this player, the default game is played non-cooperatively.
A contract o¤er, by construction, leads to a speci…c commitment for a player. Yet this o¤er does not necessarily resolve all of the player's uncertainty. He does not know what he himself has committed to until he sees all of the other contracts. If he expects the other players to o¤er contracts that list the same array of mechanisms that he does, then he believes that the …rst round revelations of all players will determine his commitment as well as the commitments of the others.
The reciprocal contracting process induces an imperfect information game with two stages. We base our analysis of this sequential game on the solution concept of perfect Bayesian equilibrium, which consists of strategies and beliefs satisfying the conditions below: i) In round 1, each type of each player i chooses his contract to maximize his expected continuation payo¤.
ii) After observing player i's contract o¤er, other players update their beliefs on his type. On the equilibrium path, the belief updates are governed by the Bayes rule. O¤ the equilibrium path, all players other than player i share a common posterior on player i's type. 13 iii) In round 2, on the equilibrium path or on the continuation games reachable by unilateral deviations from the equilibrium play, 14 each type of each player i chooses his message to the mechanisms (if all contract o¤ers include the same list of direct mechanisms) or his default game action (if some player o¤ers a di¤erent list) in order to maximize his expected continuation payo¤, given the updated beliefs.
Incentive Constraints
The main objective in this paper is providing a characterization of the outcome functions which are supportable as the perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcomes of the 13 In other words, after observing player i's o¤ the equilibrium path behavior, all the other players update their beliefs in the same way. This assumption is consistent with Fudenberg and Tirole's (1991) de…nition of perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
14 Our de…nition of perfect Bayesian equilibrium demands sequential rationality of strategies only for continuation games which are either on the equilibrium path or accessible by unilateral deviations from the equilibrium behavior. As Peters and Troncoso Valverde (2011) demonstrate, optimality of strategies in all nodes of the extensive form game is not possible to achieve: There may be continuation games triggered by players agreeing on direct mechanisms which do not have an equilibrium in pure or mixed strategies.
reciprocal contracting game. With our …rst result, we show that it is su¢ cient to restrict attention to a speci…c class of equilibria for this characterization.
Proposition 1.
If ! is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome function of the reciprocal contracting game then it is also supportable as the outcome of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of this game where i) players reciprocate: all types of all players submit a unique list of mechanisms as part of their contracts in round 1; ii) revelations are accurate: on the equilibrium path, after observing revelation i 2 T i by player i, all the other players update their posterior belief to^ i ; iii) type reports are truthful: on the equilibrium path, all players report their types truthfully to the mechanisms in round 2; iv) correlating message vectors are uniformly distributed: on the equilibrium path, for each player, each component of the correlating message vector is uniformly distributed on the interval [0; 1] regardless of the player's type and the posterior beliefs.
We provide the proof of this proposition in the Appendix together with the proof of our characterization theorem.
Property (i) above follows from a familiar argument. Suppose there exists an equilibrium where some types of some players do not reciprocate, i.e., they submit a list of mechanisms other than . The very same equilibrium outcome could have been supported by an alternative equilibrium where all types of all players agree on an "extended" list of mechanisms. This extended list replicates the non-cooperative play of the default game following the non-reciprocating behavior in the original equilibrium. Property (iii) is a direct implication of the revelation principle. Property (iv) points to the fact that correlating messages are used in order to generate jointly controlled lotteries (to be used as public randomization devices) in this class of equilibria.
The intuition for property (ii) follows from the revelation principle as well. If all types of all players submit the same list of mechanisms , their revelation messages are the only means of separating di¤erent types of players on the equilibrium path. Each revelation by player i will lead to a potentially di¤erent posterior on his types. In the class of equilibria de…ned by the proposition above, the equilibrium path revelations are re-labeled in such a way that they match the posterior beliefs they generate.
In an equilibrium which satis…es the properties above, a player can deviate from equilibrium play either by refusing to reciprocate with the other players, or by making an inaccurate revelation about his type in round 1, or by misreporting his type in round 2. The outcome functions must satisfy certain incentive constraints for these deviations not to be pro…table. We describe these constraints below and discuss how they relate to the more familiar versions invoked in the earlier literature. Then we provide a formal characterization of equilibrium outcome functions by referring to the described constraints.
Individual Rationality.
In an equilibrium where all players are expected to reciprocate, any player can trigger the non-cooperative play of the default game by o¤ering a di¤erent list of mechanisms. As a result of this unilateral deviation, each player i receives the non-cooperative payo¤ V i t i ; i ; i de…ned in (3.1). For this deviation not to be pro…table, each type of each player must expect an equilibrium payo¤ weakly higher than his non-cooperative payo¤. This consideration yields the individual rationality constraints.
After a player's refusal to reciprocate, the beliefs on the players'types need not remain the same as the prior beliefs. First of all, as a result of the refusal of player i, the other players may update their belief regarding the type of this player from prior 0 i to some posterior no i . We refer to the collection of these beliefs no = f no i g i2I as the refusal beliefs. In the construction of an equilibrium where all players reciprocate, refusal beliefs are arbitrary. This is due to the fact that standard solution concepts such as perfect Bayesian equilibrium do not put much restriction on beliefs o¤ the equilibrium path. 15 In addition to changing their beliefs on the type of a deviating player, the participants of the reciprocal contracting game may update their beliefs on the nondeviating players as well. Recall that players are allowed to make revelations about their private information as part of their contract o¤ers. As a result, their equilibrium 15 It is possible to suggest a re…nement of perfect Bayesian equilibrium by imposing additional requirements on these refusal beliefs. For instance, setting no i = 0 i for all i amounts to assuming passive beliefs (Cramton and Palfrey, 1990 ). Alternatively, one may assume that the support of refusal beliefs consists only of the types that are not strictly worse o¤ by rejecting to reciprocate. This re…nement leads to the concept of rati…ability (Cramton and Palfrey, 1995). We will continue our analysis without imposing such a re…nement and allowing for arbitrary rejection beliefs.
play may indeed unveil information on their types. Any player who contemplates deviating should understand the impact that other players'revelations will have.
Consider type t i of player i's decision to reciprocate with the others in the …rst round of the game. This player knows that the others will update their beliefs to no i if he does not reciprocate. He also comprehends that after observing the contract o¤ers, the beliefs on the other players'types will be updated to some posterior i . Recall that the non-cooperative payo¤ V i t i ; no i ; i yields the continuation payo¤ of player i from the non-cooperative play of the default game under these beliefs. There is one more complication in the analysis of player i's decision to reciprocate. Player i has to make this decision before he learns the other contracts and observes the revelations by the other players. Therefore, at the time he makes the decision, player i does not know the exact realization of the posterior i . However, the equilibrium strategies of the other players reveal the distribution over the possible posteriors.
We represent a distribution over the posteriors on the types of player i with notation i 2 ( T i ). Suppose this distribution is indeed generated by revelations made by player i on the equilibrium path. In this case, the Bayes rule implies that the expectation over the posteriors equals the prior distribution: E i j i i = 0 i . Following Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), we call distribution i Bayes plausible when it satis…es this property. If i is Bayes plausible for each player i, then we refer to the collection = f i g i2I as a posterior system.
Suppose the outcome function ! is supportable by an equilibrium where all players reciprocate with each other by submitting the same list of mechanisms. Then each player must have the incentive not to deviate by refusing to reciprocate. This is ensured with the following individual rationality condition. Under the refusal beliefs no and the posterior system , outcome function ! is individually rational if
for all t i and all i.
Consider an equilibrium of the contracting game, where no relevant information is revealed with the equilibrium contract o¤ers. We can represent the resulting information structure with a posterior system which puts unit mass on the prior distribution 0 . Under this system, the right hand side of (5.1) boils down to V i t i ; 1) . In other words, the reservation utility of player i may decrease with the level of information revealed by the contracts o¤ered in the …rst round. We will demonstrate this point with the help of the Cournot default game introduced earlier.
5.1.1. Individual Rationality and the Cournot Default Game. Suppose that the two players of the Cournot default game are negotiating over a cartel agreement by using the reciprocal contracting process we described. If these players can agree on the cartel, their agreement will determine their type dependent production levels and the monetary transfers they will make to each other. Each player has the option to refuse to participate in the cartel. By doing so, the player triggers the noncooperative play of the Cournot default game. Before they start the negotiations, each player's belief on the type of other player is uniform. That is, the prior beliefs are given as What payo¤ would a player expect from not participating in the cartel? The non-cooperative payo¤ functions we report in (3.2) indicate that Player 2 with cost (80) would receive zero payo¤ from the default game regardless of the beliefs. The non-cooperative payo¤s of the other types of players decrease in the likelihood that they are perceived to have a higher cost. This means that a larger set of outcome functions will be classi…ed as individually rational if a non-participating player is believed to be the highest cost type with probability one. This is ensured by the following refusal beliefs:
What about the beliefs on the type of the non-deviating player? Since these beliefs are equilibrium path beliefs, they should be equal to the prior belief in expectation. That is, if i is the distribution over the equilibrium beliefs on the types of player i, then E i j i i = 0 i = 0:5. As long as it satis…es this Bayes plausibility condition, any i is supportable as a distribution over the equilibrium beliefs.
Let us start with considering the non-cooperative payo¤ function of player 2 with cost (52). This type's non-cooperative payo¤ V 2 (52; 1 ; 2 ) is convex in 1 , implying that his expected default game payo¤ would increase in the information he receives on player 1's type. Therefore the right hand side of (5.1) would be minimized if the distribution of posteriors assigns unit mass to the prior distribution 
that he will not receive any additional information about his rival, these numbers determine his type dependent reservation utility.
As mentioned above, thanks to the non-convexity of function V 1 , one could reduce this reservation utility by revealing player 1 some information about the type of player 2. For instance, consider the distribution of posteriors 2 which assigns probability 3=8 to posterior 2 = 0 and probability 5=8 to posterior 2 = 0:8. Notice that 2 is Bayes plausible since E 2 j 2 2 = 0:5. In order to support 2 as the distribution of posteriors in the reciprocal contraction game, it would su¢ ce to construct an equilibrium where type (52) of player 2 makes the revelation^ 2 = 0:8 with probability one and type (80) of player 2 randomizes between^ 2 = 0:8 and^ 2 = 0 with probabilities 1=4 and 3=4 respectively. Under 2 , the expected value of the non-cooperative payo¤ for the two types of player 1 are as below: Notice that both numbers are lower than the non-cooperative payo¤s corresponding to the alternative scenario where the default Cournot game is played under the prior belief 0 2 = 0:5. Figure 1 illustrates this for type (56) of player 1. 16 In fact, it follows the analysis in Celik and Peters (2011) that any distribution other than 2 would 16 For ease of demonstration, …gure is not drawn to scale. result in a strictly higher expected non-cooperative payo¤ for at least one of the types of player 1. So far, we de…ned two distributions over the posteriors on the types of player 1 ( 1 ) and player 2 ( 2 ). These two constitute a posterior system = f 1 ; 2 g. Under the posterior system and refusal beliefs no i = 0, player 1 expects to receive payo¤ 186 for type (48) and payo¤ 94 for type (56) from the non-cooperative play of the Cournot default game. Similarly, player 2's non-cooperative payo¤ is 49 for type (52) and 0 for type (80). These …gures pin down the reservation utility levels on the right hand sides of constraints in (5.1).
The interesting point about the above construction is the decline in player 1's expected non-cooperative payo¤ as he gets superior information on the type of the other player through the latter's revelations. What is the reason for this seemingly negative value for information? The answer lies in the observation that, in this setting, it is not possible to single out one player and give him additional information without changing what the other player knows. As player 1 learns something from player 2's contract o¤er, player 2 also learns that player 1 is better informed. As a result of all this supplementary information, not only player 1 but also player 2 may choose a di¤erent default game behavior than what would have been chosen under their prior beliefs. In the Cournot game, the change in the continuation behavior of player 2 is detrimental to player 1's payo¤, even as he enjoys a higher accuracy of information. The equilibrium play of the default game under the updated information lowers player 1's payo¤ relative to what it would have been in the Bayesian equilibrium of the default game when every player is guided by his interim belief. The fact that the right hand side of the individual rationality constraint in (5.1) can decrease in the information revealed to player i is the key to understanding how partial information revelations enlarge the set of feasible outcome functions. 18 5.2. Incentive Compatibility. As we argued above, the extent of the information that the players reveal with their contracts a¤ects their continuation payo¤s from a refusal to reciprocate. The potential to signal private information has an impact on how players act when they all decide to reciprocate as well. This impact can be described by the following two requirements. First, an equilibrium outcome must ensure that each player would make an accurate revelation with his contract o¤er in the …rst round. Then, once these contracts determine the mechanisms, the same outcome must give each player the incentive to reveal his true type even after observing the information leaked by the contracts in the …rst round.
Suppose that posterior system represents the equilibrium distribution of the posterior beliefs on the players'types. Each posterior in the support of is associated with a di¤erent subgame of the reciprocal contracting game, starting with the corresponding revelation in the …rst round. How the players'types will be mapped into their actions may vary across these subgames. Let ! be the outcome function which determines this mapping for the subgame played under posterior . We 18 What is critical in this explanation is that the non-deviating player's behavior in the default game has to change depending on the information that the deviator has. In essence the equilibrium we construct punishes the deviating player by force feeding him the information. If there were a way to commit the non-deviating player to a punishment strategy, there would be no need for these equilibrium path belief updates. A similar punishment could have been sustained if we did not impose a sequential rationality condition after a deviation (if we were to look for all the Bayesian equilibria rather than the perfect Bayesian equilibria of the reciprocal contracting game) as well.
refer to the collection ! 2supp( ) as a family of outcome functions, where supp ( ) i T i is the support of . 19 Once we have an outcome function for each posterior possible to reach on the equilibrium path, we can construct the outcome function associated with the overall game by taking the expectation over these posteriors. We say that the family of outcome functions ! 2supp( ) is consistent with the outcome function ! if ! (t) = E j ;t ! (t) for all type pro…les t. 20 If ! 2supp( ) prescribes the same randomization over the action pro…les as !, regardless of the realized posterior, i.e., if
is naturally consistent with !. As long as ! is not a deterministic outcome function and supp ( ) is not singleton, one can construct other families of outcome functions consistent with !.
In the Cournot example above, posterior system is composed of two posteriors ( 1 = 0:5; 2 = 0) and ( 1 = 0:5; 2 = 0:8), which are realized with probabilities 3=8 and 5=8 respectively. Therefore, under , a family of outcome functions consists of two functions, one for each of the two posteriors. Such a family of outcome functions is consistent with the outcome function which is constructed by taking its expectation over these two posteriors.
As mentioned above, in the …rst round of the reciprocal contracting game, each type of each player must have the incentive to reveal the accurate information about his type. Since players decide on their revelations before they observe the revelations of the others, we refer to the conditions arising from this consideration as the prerevelation incentive compatibility constraints. Under the posterior system , a family of outcome functions ! 2supp( ) is pre-revelation incentive compatible if
, and for all types t i of all players i. Observe that pre-revelation incentive compatibility is satis…ed trivially when does not involve any information revelation (assigns unit mass on a single distribution). Consider the Cournot example we developed above. Since 1 is a degenerate 19 Notice that, given posterior , outcome function ! maps each type pro…le into a randomization over actions, even when the type pro…le is not in the support of the posterior. That is, ! (t) is well de…ned even when (t) = 0. 20 For instance, if the support of the posterior system is …nite, E j ;t ! (t) equals P 2supp( ) Pr ( j ; t) ! (t), where Pr ( j ; t) =
is the conditional probability of observing posterior given posterior system and type pro…le t.
distribution, pre-revelation incentive compatibility requirement in (5.3) holds trivially for player 1. However, condition (5.3) can be rather stringent for more general distributions over posteriors. For instance, in our Cournot example, the support of 2 consists of two posteriors and both these posteriors assign a non-zero probability to type (80) of player 2. Therefore any family of outcome functions satisfying the pre-revelation incentive compatibility condition must make this type indi¤erent between the two equilibrium path revelations he would make.
After the players o¤er their contracts (including the list of mechanisms and revelations on their types) in the …rst round, they have to submit their reports to the mechanisms resulting from the interaction of these contracts. In this second round of the game, the players hold additional information regarding their rivals' types, since they have already observed all the contracts. An equilibrium outcome function should give each type of each player the incentive not to imitate some other type, even under the updated equilibrium path beliefs. We capture this idea with the postrevelation incentive compatibility constraints. Under the posterior system , a family of outcome functions ! 2supp( ) is post-revelation incentive compatible if for all 2 supp ( ),
for each type pair t i , t 0 i of each player i. We are now ready to suggest a de…nition for incentive compatibility of an outcome function. As in the case of individual rationality, this de…nition will refer to a speci…ed posterior system. An outcome function ! is incentive compatible under the posterior system if there exists a family of outcome functions ! 2supp( ) , which is consistent with ! and which is pre-revelation and post-revelation incentive compatible under .
Post-revelation incentive compatibility means that each player …nds it optimal to report his type truthfully whatever information the other players reveal with their contracts. An implication of this property is that committing to truthful reporting is optimal even before observing these revelations. To see this, notice that postrevelation incentive compatibility requires inequality (5.4) to hold for all revelations in the support of the posterior system . After taking the expectation of both sides of this inequality over , we end up with the following standard interim incentive compatibility condition (5.5)
for each type pair t i , t 0 i of each player i. Accordingly, if ! is incentive compatible, it is also interim incentive compatible. However incentive compatibility is generally a more demanding condition than (5.5) since it requires truthful reporting to be optimal not only at the interim stage (under the prior 0 i ), but also at the postrevelation stage (under all equilibrium path posteriors i in the support of i ).
Incentive Compatibility and the Cournot Default Game.
We turn to the Cournot example one more time to demonstrate the procedure to examine incentive compatibility of an outcome function. We start with considering the outcome function which chooses the output levels that would maximize the industry pro…ts, i.e., the sum of the payo¤s of the two players of the Cournot game. Since the unit production costs are constant, this maximization requires that, given any type pro…le, the player with the higher unit cost produces zero output and the other player produces his monopoly output. The resulting production levels are as in the table below: In addition to deciding on their production levels, the players of the Cournot default game are allowed to make monetary transfers to each other as well. Therefore, in order to fully de…ne an outcome function, we should also specify the type dependent transfers of the players. Now recall the reservation utilities we derived for these players in Section 5.1.1. Under refusal beliefs no i = 0 and posterior system = f 1 ; 2 g, the expected non-cooperative payo¤ of player 1 was 186 for type (48) and 94 for type (56). Suppose that the monetary transfers are determined in such a way that player 1 receives a payo¤ exactly equal to his reservation utility, regardless of the type of player 2. Below are the net transfers z = z 1 z 2 , which ensure these payo¤s together with the production levels in (5.6): 21 (5.7) t 2 = 52 t 2 = 80
We label the outcome function described in (5.6) and (5.7) as ! . By construction, ! satis…es the individual rationality constraints of player 1 under no i = 0 and . Player 2's individual rationality constraints hold as well since his expected payo¤ under ! is 22 Hence, outcome function ! is individually rational under no i = 0 and . Observe that ! is interim incentive compatible as well, since it satis…es (5.5) for both players. 23 However ! does not satisfy the incentive compatibility condition we developed above. To see this, suppose that player 1 updates his belief to posterior 2 = 0 after the …rst round of the reciprocal contracting game. This happens if player 2 reveals his unit cost as high (80) with his revelation. In this case, any family of outcome functions which is consistent with ! would instruct player 2 to produce zero output regardless of the type of player 1. The reported type of player 1 determines 21 The monopoly pro…t is 16 2 = 256 under cost (48) and 12 2 = 144 under cost (56). Therefore the net transfers reported here set the type dependent payo¤ of player 1 at the targeted reservation payo¤. Notice that we only report the net transfers z since the values of z 1 and z 2 are redundant. 22 The monopoly pro…t is 14 2 = 196 under cost (52). This yields the payo¤ 196 94 = 102 net of the transfer when player 2 type (52) faces player 1 type (56). 23 Recall that either player has only two possible types. Interim incentive compatibility demands the di¤erence between the expected payo¤s of these two types not to be too large or too small. Otherwise one of the types would …nd it pro…table to imitate the other one. More speci…cally, in our linear environment, constraint (5.5) asks for the expected payo¤ di¤erence to be inbetween "the di¤erence between the unit costs of the two types"multiplied by "the expected production level of each type." For player 1, this condition can be written as Since these conditions are satis…ed, ! is interim incentive compatible.
his production level as well as the the monetary transfer he will make to player 2. Consider the reporting decision of type (48) of player 1 in round 2. If this type of the player reports his type truthfully, he would produce y 1 = 16, make the net transfer z = 70, and therefore receive the payo¤ 186, which is prescribed by the outcome function ! . By contrast, if the same type imitates type (56), then he would produce a lower amount y 1 = 12, make a lower net transfer z = 50, and end up with payo¤ (80 12 48) 12 50 = 190, which is higher than the truthful reporting payo¤ 186. This example demonstrates that incentive compatibility in the reciprocal contracting environment is generally stronger than interim incentive compatibility.
In conclusion, the monopoly output levels in (5.6) are not incentive compatible together with the monetary transfers in (5.7). The resulting outcome function ! is interim incentive compatible, yet it is not incentive compatible under the posterior system , which is the only posterior system that makes this outcome individually rational. Later in Section 7, we will demonstrate the existence of a more elaborate transfer scheme which makes the monopoly output levels incentive compatible and which yields the same type dependent payo¤s as in outcome ! . The monetary transfers of Section 7 will depend not only on the type reports submitted in round 2 of the contracting game, but also on the revelations made in round 1. We prove Theorem 1 together with Proposition 1 in the Appendix. The proof consists of two parts. In the …rst part, we show that any perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome function is individually rational and incentive compatible under some refusal beliefs no and some posterior system . This step proves the only if direction of the theorem. For the second part, we start with an outcome function ! which is individually rational and incentive compatible under some no and . We construct an equilibrium which supports the outcome function ! and which satis…es conditions (i) to (iv) of Proposition 1, proving the proposition and the if direction of the theorem.
Our characterization result suggests the following procedure to investigate whether an outcome function ! is supportable with a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the reciprocal contracting game. First, …nd the refusal beliefs and posterior systems under which ! is individually rational. Then, examine if, for any of these posterior systems, one can construct a family of outcome functions which is consistent with ! and which satis…es the pre-revelation and post-revelation incentive compatibility conditions.
An important subset of the equilibrium outcomes consists of the outcome functions satisfying the more familiar standard individual rationality and interim incentive compatibility constraints in (5.2) and (5.5). Any outcome function in this class is individually rational and incentive compatible under the degenerate posterior system that assigns unit mass on the prior 0 . Each of these outcomes can be supported by an equilibrium where no information is revealed with the contract o¤ers. This class of outcome functions also corresponds to the set of outcomes which are available through a more centralized scheme than our reciprocal contracting process. Consider a central designer who is uninformed on the types of the players and who can o¤er them a centralized contract. In case that this contract is accepted by all players, it regulates how they will play the default game. But if it is rejected by at least one of the players, the contract is null and void and the default game is played non-cooperatively. In this latter case, the designer does not have any capacity to in ‡uence the play of the default game. Conditions (5.2) and (5.5) also characterize the outcomes that this designer can implement by o¤ering contracts which will be unanimously accepted by all types of all players. Many earlier studies of default games and contracts are based on the premise that the outcomes satisfying (5.2) and (5.5) are the only outcomes to be expected when players get together to negotiate how to play a game. However, as we have seen in Section 5.1, there are outcome functions which violate condition (5.2) and yet which are still classi…ed as individually rational since they satisfy condition (5.1) under some non-degenerate posterior system. These outcome functions can be supported as equilibrium outcome functions of the reciprocal contracting game as long as they satisfy the incentive compatibility conditions in (5.3) and (5.4), which are generally stronger than the interim incentive compatibility constraint in (5.5).
Let us summarize our discussion on individual rationality and incentive compatibility. Due to the possibility of information revelation during the negotiation of contracts, some outcome functions qualify as individually rational even though they yield a payo¤ lower than what a player would expect from the play of the default game under his prior beliefs. However, supporting information revelations at the contracting stage comes at the cost of more stringent incentive compatibility requirements than the standard interim conditions. Accommodating information revelations on the equilibrium path complicates the de…nitions of the individual rationality and incentive compatibility requirements. Stating these conditions in our setting necessitates referring to posterior systems and families of outcome functions, which do not appear in the standard interim versions in (5.2) and (5.5). However, this does not mean that we could have obtained simpler characterization conditions if we limited the information revelation capacities of the players, say by removing the possibility of sending revelation messages as part of their reciprocal contracts. As long as a player has the ability to in ‡uence the resulting mechanism, he can use his decision as a credible signal of his private information. For example, Celik and Peters (2011) show that even a simple yes or no decision on a central designer's contract can reveal the type of the responding player and therefore extend the set of feasible outcome functions beyond what is outlined by the standard conditions. Accordingly, in order to use conditions (5.2) and (5.5) to characterize all the outcomes available to negotiating parties, we need not only a central designer, but also an ad hoc directive which instructs this designer to o¤er only the contracts which would be acceptable by all types of all players.
Implications for Collusion and Mechanism Design
In this section we apply our analysis of reciprocal contracting games to collusion between multiple agents interacting with the same principal. We start with a discussion of how the existing literature addresses this problem. Then we explain how the results would change if collusion is modeled as a reciprocal contracting game which accounts for information leakages during the negotiation between the colluding parties.
Consider a principal who o¤ers a grand contract to multiple agents. Each of these agents chooses the message to send to this grand contract. The grand contract maps these messages into an economic allocation and this allocation, together with the types of the agents, determine the payo¤s. One way to account for the possibility of collusion among these agents is interpreting the grand contract as a default game to be played by them. The agents have the option to play this default game by choosing their messages non-cooperatively. However they also have the technology to write down a side contract to coordinate their messages.
There is an extensive literature which considers collusion between multiple agents in the above described way. Following the seminal papers of Martimort (1997, 2000) , this literature concentrates on the assumption that the side contract is shaped by an uninformed third party who maximizes the sum of the colluding agents' payo¤s by making them acceptable o¤ers. By referring to the incentive constraints discussed in the previous section, we can formalize such a third party's optimization problem as follows. Given the default game induced by the grand contract, the third party chooses an outcome function which maximizes the sum of the ex-ante utilities of the agents subject to the standard interim individual rationality and incentive compatibility constraints in (5.2) and (5.5). The outcome which constitutes a solution to this maximization problem determines the way that the agents will respond to the grand contract.
Suppose outcome ! is a solution to the third party's side contract selection program outlined above. A nice property of ! is interim incentive e¢ ciency: Outcome ! is Pareto undominated within the class of interim incentive compatible outcome functions. 24 An important consequence of this observation is the collusion proofness principle. Instead of designing an indirect grand contract and making the agents collude to support outcome !, the principal could have induced the very same outcome by designing a direct grand contract which asks the agents to report their types. This direct contract replicates what each type of each agent does under the outcome function !. Suppose the agents are colluding when they play the default game induced by this direct grand contract. Since ! is already interim incentive e¢ cient, 25 the third party who is mediating the collusion cannot …nd a better course of action than suggesting the agents to reveal their types truthfully. In other words, ! is collusion proof. 24 To see this, suppose to the contrary that outcome function ! 0 is interim incentive compatible and it Pareto dominates !. Then ! 0 satis…es (5.5) by hypothesis and satis…es (5.2) since it Pareto dominates !. Moreover, ! 0 yields a higher total payo¤ than does !, which is a contradiction to ! being a solution to the La¤ont -Martimort program. 25 Notice that the direct grand contract is essentially constructed by removing the irrelevant messages -which are not sent on the equilibrium path -from the original indirect grand contract. Since ! is interim incentive e¢ cient under the indirect grand contract, it remains to be interim incentive e¢ cient under the direct grand contract.
The collusion proofness principle, which is …rst established by La¤ont and Martimort, provides a fundamental simpli…cation in the analysis of designing mechanisms when the responding agents have the ability to collude. Suppose we want to …nd the outcomes that a principal can support in this setting. Collusion proofness principle tells us that it is not necessary to consider all the grand contracts that this principal can design and the third party's response for each of these contracts. Instead, the result implies that the set of all the outcomes that the principal can support under collusion is identical to the set of collusion proof outcomes. Now suppose that the collusive side contract is not designed by a hypothetical third party but it is determined through the reciprocal contracting approach developed in this paper. Unlike in the third party initiated collusion, reciprocal contracting gives the agents the chance to reveal credible information about their types during the negotiation of the side contract. As a consequence, collusion possibilities of the agents are improved under reciprocal contracting. Speci…cally, the characterization result in Theorem 1 asserts that the equilibrium outcomes for the reciprocal contracting game are the individually rational and incentive compatible outcomes under arbitrary refusal beliefs and arbitrary posterior systems. As we discussed in the previous section, this set of outcomes is larger than the set of outcomes satisfying the standard interim individual rationality and incentive compatibility constraints in (5.2) and (5.5).
In order to make the comparison between the two approaches to collusion starker, let us consider the best equilibrium of the reciprocal contracting game, which maximizes the sum of the ex-ante expected utilities of the agents. Suppose! is the outcome function resulting from this equilibrium. Given an arbitrary grand contract, both outcome! and outcome ! (which is the solution to the third party's program) maximize the same objective function. However, due to the increased collusion potential under reciprocal contracting,! can yield a strictly higher value for the objective than does !. In this case,! does not satisfy the standard individual rationality constraints in (5.2). Instead, there exists a non-degenerate posterior system^ , under which! is individually rational, i.e., it satis…es (5.1). Outcome! also satis…es the pre-revelation and post-revelation incentive compatibility constraints in (5.3) and (5.4) under the same posterior system^ .
This discussion reveals the possibility that outcome! may not be interim incentive e¢ cient. That is, given the same grand contract, there may exist another outcome ! 0 , which is interim incentive compatible and which Pareto dominates the "best" reciprocal contracting outcome!. Outcome ! 0 fails to be a reciprocal contracting equilibrium outcome because it does not satisfy the pre-revelation and post-revelation incentive compatibility constraints in (5.3) and (5.4) under^ , even though it is incentive compatible in the interim sense and therefore satis…es (5.5). The unfortunate conclusion is that outcome! may not be collusion proof: Suppose the principal offers a direct grand contract to implement!. There may exist an alternative outcome function available under this direct grand contract which is interim incentive compatible and which Pareto dominates!. In this case, the agents would agree on a reciprocal collusive contract to support this alternative outcome rather than reporting their types truthfully to support!. 26 Consequently, outcome! would be available only through collusion among the agents following the design of an indirect grand contract. This argument illustrates that collusion proofness principle does not extend to settings such as the reciprocal contracting game, where there is possibility of information revelation prior to …nalizing a collusive agreement. The main problem is the discrepancy between the interim incentive compatibility constraint in (5.5) and the pre-revelation and post-revelation incentive compatibility requirements we developed in (5.3) and (5.4). In the following section, we will show that this discrepancy may vanish once we introduce more structure for the agents'preferences.
Incentive Constraints under Private Values and Single Crossing
In this section, we argue that the incentive compatibility requirements in our characterization theorem can be simpli…ed further under the standard assumptions of private values and single crossing. In particular, we show that for an important class of outcome functions which satisfy a monotonicity property, the incentive compatibility conditions in (5.3) and (5.4) boil down to the less demanding and more familiar interim incentive compatibility constraint in (5.5).
Player i's preferences exhibit private values, if his utility function depends only on the default game actions and his own type, but not on the types of the other players. In this case, the expected utility of player i can be written as u i (q; t i ), 26 Notice that this agreement does not require revelation of partial information with contract o¤ers. Therefore the alternative outcome can be supported with a pooling equilibrium of the reciprocal contracting game.
where q 2 A is a randomization over action pro…les and t i 2 T i is player i's type. To describe the second condition we impose, we relabel types of player i such that his type space T i is a subset of the set of real numbers R. Preferences of player i satisfy the single crossing property if for any two possibly randomized action pro…les q and q 0 , u i (q; t i ) u i (q 0 ; t i ) is either decreasing or increasing in t i . Single crossing property implies an order on the elements of A. That is, there exists a function h i : A ! R such that
The single crossing property is trivially satis…ed for players who have at most two types. Notice that, in our Cournot default game, both players'preferences exhibit private values and satisfy the single crossing property. Moreover, function h i ( ) which satis…es condition (7.1) can be set as the expected production level of player i. In many settings, where preferences ful…l a one dimensional condensation condition (Mookherjee and Reichelstein, 1992), function h i ( ) will have a similar natural interpretation. For instance, in independent private value auctions where each bidder's type is his own valuation, the single crossing property is satis…ed when h i equals the probability that bidder i receives the auctioned object. Similarly, in public good provision games where each provider's type is the marginal value he receives from the public good, condition (7.1) holds when h i equals the total amount of the public good. The single crossing property allows for designing schemes which separate di¤erent types of players by assigning them di¤erent levels of h i . Now we describe a structure which can be used by players to transfer utility among themselves in addition to coordinating their actions in the default game. We require that these utility transfers do not change the players' expected payo¤s. Given a posterior system , we de…ne function x i (t; ) as the transfer to player i when the realized type pro…le and posterior belief are t and respectively. A collection of these functions x = fx i g i2I is a transfer rule if it is budget balanced, i.e., P i x i (t; ) = 0 for all t; ; and outcome neutral, i.e., E j x i (t; ) = 0 for all t.
Outcome neutrality implies that transfer rules do not have any e¤ect on the incentives of players at the interim stage. Accordingly, being augmented by a transfer rule does not change the individual rationality or interim incentive compatibility properties of an outcome function. However, these transfers would a¤ect a player's incentive to make the accurate revelation in round 1 of the reciprocal contacting game and his incentive to report the true type in round 2 after learning the revelations of the other players. In order to account for these e¤ects, we revisit the de…nitions of pre-revelation and post-revelation incentive compatibility conditions. Under the posterior system , a family of outcome functions ! 2supp( ) is pre-revelation incentive compatible with transfer rule x if 
for each type pair t i , t 0 i of each player i.
7.1.
The Cournot Default Game with Transfer Rules. We now consider the Cournot default game one last time to demonstrate how a transfer rule can be used in order to ensure pre-revelation and post-revelation incentive compatibility of an outcome function. With tables (5.6) and (5.7) in Section 5.2.1, we have already introduced the outcome function ! which satis…es the individually rationality (5.1) conditions under the refusal beliefs no i = 0 and the posterior system . This posterior system required that player 2 reveals some partial information about his type with his equilibrium path revelations. We also showed that outcome function ! satis…es the interim version of the incentive compatibility constraint in (5.5). However we argued that ! is not an equilibrium outcome of the reciprocal contracting game since it fails the post-revelation incentive compatibility requirement in (5.4). Even though truthtelling is optimal in the interim stage, once player 2 reveals more information about his type, we showed that one type of player 1 would prefer to imitate the other type.
We will now augment the outcome function ! with a transfer rule x and demonstrate that the resulting outcome satis…es the pre-revelation and post-revelation incentive constraints in (7.2) and (7.3). To de…ne x , we let x 1 (t 1 ; t 2 ; 1 ; 2 ) be a function which is constant in parameters (t 2 ; 1 ) and which depends on parameters (t 1 ; 2 ) as below: Transfer rule x is constructed mainly as a means of transferring utility from one type of player 1 to the other type. Player 2 is used more like a budget-breaker in this construction. The direction of the transfer depends on the revelation that player 2 makes in round 1. The transfers cancel out when we take expectations over the posterior 2 or over the type t 1 . Now consider the family of outcome functions ! 2supp( ) which is naturally consistent with ! , i.e., ! = ! for both posteriors in the support of . First notice that, under , ! is pre-revelation incentive compatible with transfer rule x : Constraint (7.2) is trivially satis…ed for player 1 since he does not make any revelation in round 1. The same condition holds as an equality for the two types of player 2 since E t 1 x 2 (t; ) is zero regardless of his revelation. Moreover, ! is post-revelation incentive compatible with x as well: Constraint (7.3) is satis…ed for player 2 since ! is interim incentive compatible and x does not depend on t 2 . It requires slightly more work to establish the same for player 1. 27 In Section 5.2.1, we 27 Suppose the realized posterior on the type of player 2 is 2 = 0. Once augmented by the transfer rule x , outcome function w induces a payo¤ di¤erence of (186 + 10:8) (94 10:8) = 113: 6 between the two types of player 1. Constraint (7.3) demands this di¤erence to be bounded as below:
( 56 48 Since these inequalities hold, we conclude that (7.3) is satis…ed for player 1. argued that outcome ! does not satisfy constraint (5.4) for player 1. However, now that ! is augmented by the transfer rule x , the analogous condition in (7.3) holds for both types of player 1, under both posterior distributions. Let us summarize our …ndings regarding the incentive compatibility of the outcome function ! in the Cournot default game. ! is interim incentive compatible, yet it is not incentive compatible under the posterior system , which is the only posterior system that makes this outcome individually rational. Therefore ! is not an equilibrium outcome of the reciprocal contracting game. Nevertheless, ! satis…es the incentive compatibility conditions in (7.2) and (7.3) when it is augmented with the transfer rule x . This transfer rule depends on both the round 1 revelations and the round 2 type reports of the players. In the context of our Cournot default game, 28 this observation points to the existence of an equilibrium outcome function which is di¤erent from ! but which induces the same type dependent production levels and the same type dependent payo¤s as in ! .
General Default Games with Transfer Rules.
In this section, we prove a result extending what we observed in the context of the Cournot default game to general settings satisfying the private values and single crossing conditions. We show that, as long as a monotonicity property holds, an interim incentive compatible outcome function can be augmented with a transfer rule such that the resulting outcome satis…es the pre-revelation and post-revelation incentive constraints in (7.2) and (7.3). Such a transfer rule can be found for any arbitrary posterior system. We start with recalling standard results from screening theory. Under the private values assumption and the single crossing property, incentive compatibility demands a monotonic relationship between player i's type and function h i ( ) which satis…es condition (7.1). In particular, interim incentive compatibility condition (5.5) implies interim monotonicity of the outcome function, i.e., h i h
i is weakly decreasing in t i for all i. For instance, in our Cournot default game example, interim monotonicity requires that each player's expected production is weakly decreasing in his cost, where the expectation is taken over the di¤erent types of the other player given the prior beliefs. Moreover, many of the incentive compatibility constraints are redundant under these conditions: If the interim (or post-revelation) incentive compatibility constraints are satis…ed between all the "adjacent" types of player i, then all the other interim (or post-revelation) incentive compatibility constraints, including the ones between the non-adjacent types of player i, hold as well.
In order to state our result, we must also de…ne a stronger monotonicity requirement for outcome functions. We say that outcome function ! satis…es ex-post monotonicity if h i (! (t i ; t i )) is weakly decreasing in t i for all t i and all i. For instance, in our Cournot default game example, ex-post monotonicity requires that each player's production is weakly decreasing in his cost regardless of the other player's type. Unlike interim monotonicity, ex-post monotonicity is not implied by the interim incentive compatibility condition.
Theorem 2. Suppose all the players' preferences exhibit private values and satisfy the single crossing condition (7.1) with functions fh i ( )g i2I . Suppose further that outcome function ! is interim incentive compatible and ex-post monotonic with respect to fh i ( )g i2I . Let be an arbitrary posterior system. There exists a transfer rule x such that the family of outcome functions which is naturally consistent with ! is pre-revelation and post-revelation incentive compatible with x under .
We give a short description of the proof here and provide the complete proof in the Appendix. Suppose ! is an interim incentive compatible and ex-post monotonic outcome function. Mookherjee and Reichelstein (1992) show the existence of transfers which ensure the dominant strategy incentive compatibility of !. 29 These transfers are outcome neutral in the interim sense E t i j 0 i
x i (t i ; t i ) = 0 . However they are not necessarily budget balanced ( P i x i (t) 6 = 0). Notice that dominant strategy incentive compatibility is stronger than the post-revelation incentive constraints in (7.3). We follow an expected externality transformation of the Mookherjee and Reichelstein transfers by using the …rst round revelations of the players. These transformations are similar to the ones constructed by Arrow (1979) and d'Aspremont and Gerard-Varet (1979) for ensuring balanced budget implementation of e¢ cient outcomes. The resulting outcome function satis…es the post-revelation incentive constraints by construction. Moreover, the pre-revelation incentive constraints in (7.2) hold as well for all types of all players as equalities. 29 Mookherjee and Reichelstein …nd these transfers for a continuum of types model. Adapting their transfers for a discrete type model such as ours is not trivial since the revenue equivalence theorem does not apply. 7.3. Collusion Proofness Revisited. We now revisit the collusion interpretation of the reciprocal contracting procedure, which we …rst discussed in Section 6. We assume that the default game (which may have been induced by a grand contract) satis…es the private values and single crossing conditions. Suppose the aim is …nding the "best"reciprocal contracting outcome. In Section 6, we identi…ed this outcome as the one which maximizes the sum of the ex-ante expected utility levels of the players / agents subject to the individual rationality and incentive compatibility requirements developed in Section 5. In light of Theorem 2, we consider a relaxed version of this maximization problem, where the objective function and the individual rationality condition are the same as before, but the incentive compatibility requirement is replaced by the weaker interim incentive compatibility constraint in (5.5). We denote the solution to this relaxed problem as!.
Since outcome! is individually rational, we know that it satis…es condition (5.1) under some refusal beliefs~ no and posterior system~ . Now suppose that outcomẽ ! is ex-post monotonic. 30 In this case, it follows from Theorem 2 that! can be augmented with a transfer rule which would make the resulting allocation satisfy the pre-revelation and post-revelation incentive compatibility conditions in (7.2) and (7.3). Assuming that the players can commit to utility transfers as part of their contracts, this observation means that the best reciprocal contracting outcome is either! or a transfer rule augmented version of it which induces the same type dependent actions (without considering the utility transfers) and the same interim payo¤s as!. Moreover, outcome! is interim incentive e¢ cient, i.e., it is Pareto undominated within the class of interim incentive compatible outcome functions. As we argued in Section 6, this last property implies collusion proofness of! as well as of its transfer rule augmented versions.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1 and Theorem 1.
PART I:
Suppose there exists a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the reciprocal contracting game such that ! is the equilibrium outcome function. First, we will construct , 30 In many applications (such as the Cournot competition, independent private value auctions, public good provision) maximization of the (weighted) sum of players'expected payo¤s yields an ex-post monotonic outcome function.
no , and ! 2supp( ) by using the properties of the equilibrium. Then we will show that ! satis…es the individual rationality and incentive compatibility requirements together with the constructed , no , and ! 2supp( ) .
1) Construction of ,
no , and ! 2supp( ) Consider equilibrium path contracts o¤ered by an arbitrary player i. After observing each of these contracts, other players update their beliefs on player i's type using the Bayes rule. We let the equilibrium distribution over these posteriors be i . Since the ex ante expectation over the posteriors equals the prior beliefs, distribution i is Bayes plausible. The posterior system is de…ned as f i g i2I . There are in…nitely many possible mechanisms for each player and therefore there are in…nitely many mappings from revelations to the mechanism pro…les. Accordingly, whatever strategies the other players are following in equilibrium, a player can always …nd a list^ which would match the lists of the other players with probability zero. Consider an arbitrary contract for player i which includes the list^ . Notice that by o¤ering this contract, player i guarantees that the continuation game is the non-cooperative play of the default game with probability one. We let refusal belief no i be the (possibly o¤ the equilibrium path) posterior belief on player i's type following the observation of this contract.
no equals f no i g i2I . Consider the stage of the game after the announcement of a pro…le of equilibrium path contracts. Consistent with the Bayes rule, the beliefs are updated to some posterior which is in the support of . Starting at this stage, the perfect Bayesian equilibrium pins down the continuation strategy for each type of each player (including the types which are not in the support of the posterior, i.e., t i such that i (t i ) = 0). These strategies determine a mapping from the type pro…les to distributions over actions. We let ! be this mapping. Bayes rule implies that the family of outcome functions ! 2supp( ) is consistent with !.
2) Verifying the constraints
We now need to show that !, , no , and ! 2supp( ) together satisfy the individual rationality and incentive compatibility constraints.
The right hand side of the individual rationality constraint in (5.1) corresponds to the payo¤ from a particular (possibly o¤ the equilibrium path) strategy for player i with type t i . The strategy involves …rst o¤ering a contract that includes the mechanism list^ that we discussed above. This contract triggers the non-cooperative play of the default game. In the sequel, the strategy instructs player i to follow the Bayesian equilibrium strategy for the default game under the posteriors i (which depend on the other players'contracts) and no i . Sequential rationality requires that the other players follow their Bayesian equilibrium strategies in the continuation game as well. For the strategy explained above not to be a pro…table deviation for player i with type t i , the individual rationality constraint in (5.1) must hold.
It follows from the construction of the posterior system that any distribution i in the support of i corresponds to a posterior belief on player i following the observation of an equilibrium path contract o¤er. Therefore, for player i with type t i , the right hand side of the pre-revelation incentive compatibility constraint in (5.3) equals to the expected payo¤ from o¤ering the contract corresponding to posterior 0 i 2 supp ( i ) and then following the equilibrium continuation play. 31 For this strategy not to be a pro…table deviation, condition (5.3) must be satis…ed. Similarly, post-revelation incentive compatibility condition in (5.4) follows from the fact that type t i of player i does not strictly prefer to follow the continuation equilibrium strategy of any other type after observing the contract o¤ers of all players.
PART II:
Suppose there exists ! which satis…es the individual rationality and incentive compatibility conditions together with some and no . Incentive compatibility implies existence of a family of outcome functions ! 2supp( ) which is consistent with ! and which satis…es conditions (5.3) and (5.4). We start our proof by assuming that all outcome functions in this family are deterministic. That is, function ! maps type pro…les t into a single action pro…le in A rather than a distribution over action pro…les for all in the support of . Under this assumption, we will construct a pro…le of strategies and beliefs satisfying conditions (i) -(iv) de…ned in Proposition 1. Then, we will argue that these strategies induce ! as the outcome function. As a third step to our proof, we will show that the strategies and beliefs we constructed constitute a perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the reciprocal contracting game. In the …nal step, we will accommodate the possibility of stochastic ! by showing that the players'correlating messages can be used in order to support stochastic outcomes.
1) Strategies and Beliefs a) Equilibrium contracts:
31 In the equilibrium which supports outcome !, there may be multiple contract o¤ers by player i which all lead to the same posterior 0 i . In this case, the relevant deviation strategy is randomizing between these contracts with probabilities which re ‡ect their equilibrium frequencies.
Recall that a contract by player i consists of a list of direct mechanisms ( ) and a revelation^ i 2 T i . In the equilibrium we construct, all types of all players submit a unique list of mechanisms ( ), satisfying condition (i) of Proposition 1. We will describe this list shortly. The equilibrium also instructs each player i to make revelations only within the support of i . Since is a belief system, i is a Bayes plausible distribution of posteriors on player i's types. Therefore there exists a revelation strategy for player i where di¤erent types of this player decide on the revelations in such a way that, whenever this player makes a revelation i 2 supp ( i ), Bayes rule assigns the posterior^ i to his type. This revelation strategy is consistent with condition (ii) of Proposition 1.
On the equilibrium path, player i makes revelations only within the support of
i . Yet, in order to fully de…ne function , we have to describe the values it will take for all posteriors. In our construction, whenever player i makes a revelation^ i which is not in the support of i , the equilibrium contracts interpret this as if this player made some other revelation within the support of i . To formalize this idea, we let which is in the support of the posterior system . Recall that ! is assumed to be deterministic for all 2 supp ( ) for this step of the proof. Let ! i (t) 2 A i be the action taken by player i in action pro…le ! (t). We are now ready to state the list of mechanisms that the players will submit as part of their reciprocal contracts. A direct mechanism for player i maps the type reports t and the jIj K matrix of correlating messages n into an action in A i . When players reveal^ 2 i2I T i in the …rst round, function determines the mechanisms in the second round according to the following formula:
Notice that this function is constant in n. That is, when ! is deterministic, the mechanisms do not need to depend on the correlating messages. We will later use these messages to show that a stochastic ! can also be supported by direct mechanisms as well.
b) Equilibrium beliefs:
After the …rst round of the game, all players observe the contract o¤ers. Description of an equilibrium demands specifying the beliefs on each player's type as a function of the contract he o¤ers. On the equilibrium path, player i o¤ers contracts with the list described above and a revelation^ i in the support of i . After observing this o¤er, abiding by the Bayes rule, the other players update their belief on this player's type to^ i . Notice that these equilibrium path beliefs satisfy the "accuracy requirement" (ii) of Proposition 1. O¤ the equilibrium path, the beliefs on player i's type are updated to In other words, if player i o¤ers the list and submits a revelation^ i in the support of i , the other players update their belief to^ i assuming that his revelation is "accurate." Otherwise, when he o¤ers the list and submits a revelation outside the support of i , the other players change their belief to c) Equilibrium reports to direct mechanisms which are induced by : Suppose, in the …rst round, all players o¤er contracts including the list we described above. In the second round, each player i should submit a type report t i and a correlating message vector n i to the resulting mechanisms. In the equilibrium we construct, t i equals the type of player i and all dimensions of n i are uniformly and independently distributed on the set [0; 1], satisfying conditions (iii) and (iv) respectively in Proposition 1.
d) O¤ the equilibrium path default game actions: Suppose the players' contracts do not all include the same list of mechanisms. According to the rules of the reciprocal contracting game, each player must choose a default game action in the second round. In this case, the equilibrium stipulates that each player chooses his Bayesian equilibrium action (or randomization over the actions) under the beliefs updated according to the rule (b) above.
For completeness, we should also specify the o¤ the equilibrium path continuation strategies and beliefs for the decision nodes following the players'agreement on a list of mechanisms other than the list described above. We set these as arbitrary.
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2) Outcome function supported by the equilibrium We will now argue that if players follow the strategies described above, the resulting outcome function is indeed !. Consider the equilibrium path subgame that begins when players all submit the list and their revelations are^ 2 supp ( ). The equilibrium strategies prescribe that each player i reports his true type t i in round 2 and determines his round 1 revelation message^ i in a way to support i as the distribution over the posteriors on his type. The proof follows from the fact that the family of outcome functions ! 2supp( ) is consistent with !: ! (t) = E^ j ;t !^ (t) for all type pro…les t.
3) Sequential rationality of strategies, consistency of beliefs In this part of the proof, we demonstrate that the strategies and beliefs described above constitute a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the reciprocal contracting game. . Optimality of the chosen correlating messages is trivial, since they do not a¤ect the outcome when ! is deterministic.
We now consider deviations from the behavior described in (a). There are two types of possible deviations in the …rst round of the game. First, a player i with type t i may choose to o¤er a contract which includes the equilibrium list together with some revelation^ implies that this is not a pro…table deviation. Secondly, a player i with type t i may choose to o¤er a contract which includes a list other than . According to the beliefs in (b), all players change their belief on player i to no i , and the beliefs on the other players are determined by the posterior system 32 Reaching to these decision nodes requires all players to deviate from equilibrium behavior. Our solution concept does not impose any requirement on actions chosen on such nodes. 33 A revelation outside of supp ( i ) is strategically equivalent to the revelation 1 i which is in supp ( i ).
. After this deviation, all players follow their non-cooperative default game actions in the second round. For player i, this continuation behavior yields an expected payo¤ equal to the right hand side of the constraint (5.1). Individual rationality of the outcome function ! implies that this is not a pro…table deviation either.
4) Stochastic ! The arguments above apply when all outcome functions in family ! 2supp( ) are deterministic. In this …nal part of the proof we discuss how the uniformly distributed correlating messages can be utilized to deal with stochastic ! , without changing the incentives provided to the players. Suppose that n k i is the k th dimension of the correlating message sent by player i. We de…ne n k as P i n k i , which is the fractional part of the real number P i n
